PYEONGTAEK, SOUTH KOREA – Much has been made since Prime Minister Fumio Kishida issued three new strategic documents last week that will provide the policy direction for Japanese security for the next five to 10 years. The government released the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program, the first updates for those documents since 2013 and 2018 respectively, and the contents have generated a wide range of reporting since.
Already, there are a great number of news stories discussing the “major shift” in Japanese security practice and how Japan is leaving its “pacifist” roots behind. The Wall Street Journal published an op-ed titled “The sleeping Japanese giant awakes,” while The Diplomat called this moment “Japan’s major turning point on defense policy.” Meanwhile, the Council on Foreign Relations characterized its analysis as an explainer on “How Japan is doubling down on its military power.”
Certainly, there are things in the security documents worthy of attention. The pledge to double Japan’s defense spending by fiscal year 2027 not only eliminates a decades-long taboo of exceeding 1% of GDP, it means that the Japanese government’s declared intent is to jump from the world’s ninth-largest defense spender to No. 3 behind only the United States and China.
Further, the stated intent to field counterstrike capabilities has led many to call into question whether Japan has abandoned its “exclusively defensive” defense policy. Those observers argue that “counterstrike” is merely a guise for “pre-emptive strike,” meaning that Japan could deliver an attack on foreign soil before falling under attack first.
While this stirs debate and makes for catchy headlines, it belies the real substance of the new security documents. Instead, it is better to assess them with the right context and a more measured approach to analysis.
The security documents are products of a decades-long evolution of Japanese security practice. They signal that Japan intends to field some capabilities commensurate with other “middle powers” while trying to build up its defense industrial base. Importantly, nothing in the documents signals an abandonment of the core principles of Japan’s security, but a refinement of roles, missions and capabilities to enable Japan to match the requirements of the security environment and to fulfill its role both as a Group of Seven leader and protector of the rules-based international order. How does one come to that sort of conclusion rather than the more sensationalist takes? There are three points to keep in mind when assessing these security documents.
First, it is essential to understand what the documents are and what they are not. The three documents are not “laws” that bind the Japanese government to specific actions. Nor are they strictly “white papers” — strategic communications tools meant simply to signal interests and intentions to allies and adversaries. Rather, they are policy documents intended to give top-down direction to government officials for Japan’s security decision-making.
The oldest of the documents is the Defense Buildup Program. This document provides the five-year acquisition plan for the Japan Self-Defense Forces, prescribing the budget priorities and types of capabilities they would be working to improve or obtain.
The National Defense Strategy is a policy document that presents an assessment of the threat environment, prescriptions for defense operations and priorities for acquisition. And, finally, the National Security Strategy is meant to provide the whole-of-government policy direction for Japan’s national security interests and objectives.
Together, the National Security Strategy sets the foundation, the National Defense Strategy clarifies the military-specific aspects of that strategy and the Defense Buildup Program lays out the acquisition plan for securing the capabilities needed to actualize those strategies.The second point to understand is that everything in the documents is evolutionary, not revolutionary. Although some of the decisions are significant, they have been years — and in some cases — decades in the making.
Third, there are many takeaways from these documents. After all, there is more than 100 pages of substance, and each inclusion was something that Japanese government lawmakers and bureaucrats agonized over. Should India be mentioned before the South Korea? How important is acquisition of new capabilities compared to sustainment of current systems?
First, the documents signal that the biggest policy shift will come in trying to build Japan’s defense industrial base. While most observers will focus on the intent to reach 2% of GDP in defense spending, the security documents point to some more foundational objectives. Namely, they direct the government to pursue initiatives that grow Japan’s domestic defense industry.
While Japan has tried to foster this industrial sector, the incentivization structure simply was not there — these security documents indicate a desire to fix that. Part of that is through the planned increase in defense spending; that money must go somewhere, and Japanese companies that want a slice of that pie must take on projects that they otherwise might not pursue.
Second, the Japanese government reaffirmed its commitment to the “Three Non-nuclear Principles.” Every so often, there is a debate over whether Japan will attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, which is especially salient now given Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, concerns over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile development. These policy documents signal that any discussion inside the government on acquiring nuclear weapons is a nonstarter for at least the next few years. Third, there is a call for even greater cooperation between law enforcement and the SDF. While this initiative is not new, there are certain elements in the new security documents which were notable. This includes the intent to create a new interagency coordination framework and to strengthen the transition process for when law enforcement assets shift to operating under the control of SDF authorities after a certain threshold is reached.
Fourth, the security documents call for protecting Japan “from all directions.” What this means is not just air, land and sea, but space and cyberspace, economic security, etc. While the Japanese government has been working on these issues for years, budgetary constraints had always limited its ability to commit resources to the myriad problem sets. Fifth, Japan has renewed its commitment to expanding its regional hub in Djibouti.
This has been an initiative on the docket for years, but the Japanese government has not been able to generate the political or resource prioritization needed to transform its SDF footprint in Djibouti from simply a home base for antipiracy missions to a true hub for evacuation operations and other mission sets in Africa and southwestern Asia.
Sixth, the security documents call for acquisition of sufficient munitions stockpiles. There will be many logisticians breathing sighs of relief upon seeing this inclusion, as the Self-Defense Forces have been known to acquire all the best equipment to bring to a fight, but not enough munitions to sustain it.
Presumably, the Japanese government learned lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war in how quickly stockpiles can become depleted once the conflict starts, and the security documents call for the Japanese government to ensure that the same predicament does not happen to them. Finally, the security document emphasized the development of “Flexible Deterrent Options.” Essentially, these are prescribed actions that comprise a “menu” for when a perceived adversary commits some anticipated transgression.
Government officials must prioritize which initiatives get implemented first, and the Kishida administration has a long road ahead for raising the funds necessary to achieve its goals by fiscal year 2027. Already, he has put these policies in jeopardy by advertising the intent to raise taxes in order to actualize the increased defense spending.
With his public approval rating already plummeting, this may have been a major misstep. Although Kishida’s stated intent was only to use tax increases to account for about a quarter of the expected budget hike, any discussion of tax increases has historically hurt public opinion of Japanese prime ministers. The past week’s polling has continued that trend.
A further weakened Kishida administration will find it difficult to push through any controversial policies, especially those that could impede economic goals. Although these security documents will outlast Kishida, implementation still depends on the prime minister and his administration; thus, policy direction may not necessarily mean policy achievement.Whatever the political landscape ahead may be, the road map is published. For the Japanese government, it is now a matter of traversing the course that has been charted for the country’s security for the years to come.
Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.
Source: The Japan Times