Twenty years after Israel's landmark pullout from the Gaza Strip, the country finds itself deeply reengaged there due to a nearly two-year war with Hamas that has devastated the territory. Despite the 2005 withdrawal, which involved dismantling 21 Jewish settlements and removing Israeli troops, ongoing conflict ensures a continued military presence for the foreseeable future.
The disengagement, which also involved evacuating four settlements in the West Bank, was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's bold and divisive initiative meant to reignite peace talks with the Palestinians. Instead, it fractured Israeli society and indirectly strengthened Hamas—a ripple effect that persists today.
184 Palestinian journalists killed in Gaza war faced hunger and hardship
The emotional scenes of Israeli soldiers forcibly evacuating Jewish settlers ignited a backlash that fueled the growth of right-wing and settler movements. That momentum partly paved the way for the political rise of far-right figures like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Just this week, Smotrich touted a new settlement plan near Jerusalem designed to undermine any future Palestinian state.
For Palestinians, the pullout changed little in terms of day-to-day control. Despite hopes, Israel and Egypt quickly imposed a blockade, limiting movement and goods, which led to worsening conditions and a growing divide between Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas, after winning 2006 elections and ousting the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, further consolidated power.
Military analyst Kobi Michael explains the withdrawal was driven by the unsustainable cost of protecting 8,000 settlers in Gaza, surrounded by 1.5 million Palestinians. In contrast, West Bank settlements—now home to over 500,000 Israelis—are more entrenched and socially supported. However, the unilateral nature of the Gaza exit, done without coordination with the Palestinian Authority, gave Hamas a propaganda victory that helped win elections and justify continued armed resistance.
The withdrawal also left deep psychological scars in Israel, especially the footage of settler resistance and forced removals. Michael believes no future Israeli government will repeat such a move, complicating any progress toward a two-state solution.
Anita Tucker, now 79, was among the first settlers in Gaza in the 1970s. She describes a once-thriving, peaceful community built amid sand dunes, where even relations with Palestinian neighbors were initially cordial. But she vividly recalls the 2005 evacuation, when hundreds of soldiers came to remove around 400 residents. Some neighbors burned their homes in protest.
She believes the withdrawal worsened life for both Palestinians and Israelis, citing years of rocket fire and the deadly Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Despite everything, her family remains emotionally tied to their former home, with some of her grandchildren even fighting near it during the current war. She says they’re still willing to return and rebuild
Many Palestinians felt that the 2005 withdrawal left them in an "open-air prison." While Hamas governed inside, Israel maintained control over borders, airspace, and resources. For many, Sharon's move was seen not as a step toward peace, but as a way to consolidate control over the West Bank.
Today, after nearly two years of war, Israel occupies over 75% of Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu has made it clear that long-term security control is part of the plan. This leaves many Palestinians, like 67-year-old Sabah Abu Audeh, fearing a return to full occupation. Others, like Aouni Timras from Nuseirat camp, feel crushed by dashed hopes and constant conflict.
Palestinian analyst Amjad Shawa argues that Israel is now reoccupying Gaza through military zones meant to make life unbearable and drive Palestinians out. Writer Mostafa Ibrahim, whose home was destroyed in the war, agrees that this renewed presence is part of Israel’s strategy to block the formation of a Palestinian state.
Retired Israeli Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, who oversaw the 2005 evacuation, believes the withdrawal was strategically necessary due to constant attacks on settlers. But he regrets that Israel didn’t use the moment to negotiate terms or seek concessions from the Palestinians.
He also criticizes Israel’s “containment” approach to Hamas post-withdrawal, which allowed the group to evolve into a sophisticated military force. According to Harel, Israel failed to recognize how dangerous Hamas had become.
While he doesn’t blame the disengagement itself for the devastating Oct. 7 attacks, Harel argues the real failure was what Israel failed to do in the nearly two decades that followed.
