Mahfuzur Rahman
The Afghan Government, which was formed through a general election backed by the US-led coalition, is now facing the major challenge from its main opposition, the Talibans, since the February 2020 agreement of the US to pull out its troops, along with that of its allies, from the soil of Afghanistan. The only guarantee that the US had sought from the Talibans in that agreement is to ensure that the Afghan soil is not used by any militant forces, particularly al-Qa’eda, for any offensives against the US. The agreement, unfortunately, did not keep anything to safeguard the present Afghan government or the prevailing system of governance.
The US took 20 years to learn a lesson that Soviet Union had taken 10 years to learn. It was exactly in the soil of Afghanistan. Now almost after 20 years of US military presence in Afghanistan, under the cover of NATO plus allies, the US had enough of lessons and decided to pull out from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. It was the other September 11 of 2001 that instigated the US to get militarily involved in Afghanistan in the pretext of Afghanistan’s support to al-Qa’eda leaders.
The Talibans, the popular term to coin the leaders, forces, representatives, activists and followers of Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan, being ousted from the power in 2001, never gave up their fight to win back Kabul.
The Talibans, mostly Pashtun by ethnic identity, and enjoying stronghold in the South and East of Afghanistan, have by now reportedly captured and secured half of Afghanistan in its fold, and seized even more in order to regain what they lost in 2001.
The US-led coalition was supposed to quit Afghanistan within 14 months of signing the agreement, i.e. by April 2021. The Biden administration has declared now to do so by August 2021, days before the 20th anniversary of 9/11. Nobody is sure whether this dateline will be kept.
Many Bangladeshi nationals are working in Afghanistan, particularly
in the INGOs. BRAC still has its operations there. A change in regime
will put them in a hostile environment. Many governments in the region
are maintaining a separate track to keep the Talibans in a good humour.
In diplomacy, there is no alternative to such a strategy, and this is a high time
The Republicans, like Brookings; and even the Democrats, like CFR, Asia Foundation, etc, are now passively advocating lingering the US withdrawal, as they consider withdrawal means surrender, defeat of the cause and a revert to 2001.
The US has done its homework, and settled for a minimum – a guarantee that the new regime will not extend its hands to al-Qa’eda or similar anti-US offensives. China has double agenda. First, to secure that there is no spill over of Taliban’s ideology among its Uighur Muslims. Second, to secure part of its Road and Belt Initiatives that run through Pakistan. Russia will be happy if Talibans remain confined to Afghanistan. Both Iran and Pakistan have huge stake in Afghanistan. First, the influx of refugee. Both the countries have sizeable Afghan refugee. A change in regime may impact the number. Both the countries expect that the number will be reduced as many of them will be encouraged to go back. However, there will definitely be fresh influx as well. The relationships with both Iran and Pakistan are far more complex. With Iran, there is a fundamental difference of ideology, i.e. religious theocracy. This mostly depends on the new Iranian leadership.
And with Pakistan, things are more complicated, but lot needs to be sorted out with Pakistan military. Following the news of international media, it is now clear that the Talibans are taking full advantage of the US withdrawal and consolidating its grip by capturing districts after districts.
The cities of Herat and Kandahar, which are now virtually sieged by the Talibans, will be crucial in order to pose serious threat to Kabul. The Kabul government, in absence of active support from the US-led coalition, may not be able to depend on its air power any more. The entire air strike capability of the Afghan government depends on the air force hardware which needs to be in continuous supply from the West. Without financial assistance and technical support, the Afghan government will not be able to withstand the ground offensives of the Talibans.
The 2020 Afghanistan Conference in Geneva pledged US$3.3 billion in aid to Afghanistan, but how much really will be channelled, and will be available for defence purchases can be doubted. The US alone had spent US$1 trillion in the last 20 years and lost more than 6,000 lives, of which more than half are contractors and suppliers. How much they will now respond, when they will see that battle is lost, needs to be seen.
Many fear a prolonged civil war in Afghanistan. I do not see much appetite in the present Afghan government for a prolonged war without any active support from the outside forces.
It is true that in the last 20 years, many things have changed in Afghanistan. There are schools and colleges, there are a number of cultural institutions, and there are a lot number of beneficiaries. However, these grow under a strong umbrella of Western forces. These may not be self-sustainable.
If we need to look forward, we need to consider a new Taliban regime in Afghanistan -- Taliban 2.0. The region is already realigning itself with the possible changing environment.
The central Asian countries are also worried with the possible change of status quo in Afghanistan. Tajikistan may climb to a hot seat if Afghan Tajiks, who are always anti-Taliban, are forced to exile. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are similarly worried. Here, there can be a role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an organization where all regional players like Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and India are members. Interestingly, Afghanistan’s plea to become a full member of the SCO was not considered favourably since 2015. It could have been a better shield for the Afghan government than the Western forces.
With a pro-Taliban Afghanistan, the implication for India and Bangladesh is not also small. New Delhi needs to develop its relationships with Kabul, no matter who sits there. The need is mostly strategic, but not stops there. In the last 25 years, India has seen rise of militant groups in its soil, many of which have the similar ideology as that of the Talibans.
This is true for Bangladesh as well. As there are strict measures against the Islamic militants in Bangladesh at the moment, many aspirants may think of migrating to Afghanistan and be a part of the possible triumph. Additionally, many may even be encouraged to dream of a similar triumph in Bangladesh.
Many Bangladeshi nationals are working in Afghanistan, particularly in the INGOs. BRAC still has its operations there. A change in regime will put them in a hostile environment. Many governments in the region are maintaining a separate track to keep the Talibans in a good humour. In diplomacy, there is no alternative to such a strategy, and this is a high time.
Mahfuzur Rahman is a former ambassador of Bangladesh. He is an alumnus of BUET, Monash University, Harvard University, Maryland University.
