Faisal J. Abbas
A few weeks ago, I took part in the Delphi Economic Forum and I was asked to predict the outcome of the tense geopolitical situation that has emerged in the Gulf and wider Middle East since the eruption of Operation Epic Fury in February.
I responded that even the Oracle who once inhabited this charming Greek town would have thrown in the towel when it comes to analyzing this particular war, which took the world by surprise, or when it comes to foreseeing the next move of the players involved, particularly unpredictable characters such as US President Donald Trump.
What makes things more complicated is the barrage of contradictory news, confirmations and denials, as well as a huge number of leaks, some of which have been true while others have been completely false.
But we forget that this is a war and, in war, the first casualty is often the truth.
Yet when it comes to reading the Saudi position, pundits are advised to remember a few key things before reaching a decisive conclusion. Firstly, Saudi officials say what they mean and mean what they say. Secondly, what is said in public is said in private (having attended several off-the-record briefings over the past 10 years, I can absolutely vouch for that). Thirdly, sometimes, especially during critical times, silence is a strategic choice and not a coincidence — particularly when the stakes are high and there are many moving parts behind the scenes.
As such, to understand the Saudi position on recent developments, we need to go back to the original statements issued in the early days of the war. These included statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Cabinet meeting on March 10 chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which affirmed Saudi Arabia’s “full right to take all necessary measures to protect its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to deter aggression.”
Some may have dismissed the position as pure lip service; others accused Riyadh of being “too dovish” and argued that a “more hawkish” position should have been taken to satisfy public opinion. Riyadh decided that public safety outweighs public opinion and opted to ignore such statements, and rightly so, as arguing with those spreading them, in today’s weaponized social media environment, would be like “wrestling with a pig — you get dirty while the pig enjoys it.”
Behind the scenes, I imagine the calculus would have been as follows: The main priority was to do whatever it took to protect the Kingdom’s citizens and residents, extend a helping hand to the more-exposed Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors, and take the necessary steps to ensure the war did not spill over and become an endless and dangerous regional one (as opposed to the US/Israel vs. Iran). In addition, during the war, deterrence needed to be established with Iran while at the same time keeping the door open for a negotiated solution, especially when it seemed that the military campaign was taking its toll mostly on Gulf countries and global energy supplies. This meant it had the potential to become a global crisis.
Iran had already made it clear, by heavily targeting oil and gas facilities in Gulf countries and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, that it intended to make the war as expensive as possible for the rest of the world. The Gulf countries engaging in the war fully would not have made a difference for the US and Israel, which already enjoy massive firepower (and refuse to put boots on the ground), but would have further intensified the risk to oil facilities and more importantly, civilian targets in the Kingdom and the Gulf. Needless to say, a global energy crisis would hurt the US both domestically and in its war effort, let alone the impact it would have on our region.
Naturally, governments communicate in various ways. It would make my job as a newspaper editor much easier if those ways were exclusively in the form of official press releases. However, sometimes actions speak louder than words. Indeed, a symbolic yet strategic action, such as allowing the Iranian ambassador to remain in Riyadh while requiring the military attache to leave, should be read as a statement in itself — particularly as this was accompanied by clear and full support for Pakistani mediation efforts, which are still ongoing. Along with the regular calls between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, this all meant that communication channels remained open.
Of course, Riyadh has long been aware of the Iranian regime’s malicious intentions and has actively deterred its threats since 1979. This is why it would have welcomed any logical approach to neutralize these threats, while at the same recognizing that Iran will always be a neighbor, and the dangers of a miscalculated move would have dire consequences.
One strong argument to be used as an example here is that had the US listened to our warnings a decade ago, when President Barack Obama was negotiating the JCPOA (the Iran nuclear deal), we would not be in this situation today. If his administration had taken our advice and addressed not only Iran’s nuclear enrichment, but also its support for proxy militias and its ballistic missile program, the current crisis could have been avoided.
On an equal footing, I would tend to believe recent media reports, albeit unconfirmed by official Saudi sources yet, that the Kingdom had silently struck back against Iran and pro-Tehran militias targets in Iraq in recent weeks.
Naturally, this would not have been done as part of the US-Israeli military campaign but as retaliation for the earlier Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia and as an attempt to deter Tehran, which was the first to breach the 2023 Beijing Declaration.
Still, I would suspect the Iranians were informed in advance of Riyadh’s retaliatory action, given Saudi norms and the desire to abide by rules of engagement that emphasize the need to avoid civilian casualties at any cost.
Similarly, I would describe a recent report in the Financial Times that the Kingdom had floated a regional non-aggression treaty with Iran as partially true. A path for regional dialogue, including such a pact, is probably one of several options under discussion to address the postwar period, particularly in light of security concerns given the absence of any dialogue on these issues within the bilateral negotiations between Iran and the US. This makes a lot of sense, given that peaceful coexistence serves all agendas, particularly here in Saudi Arabia.
However, it might be inaccurate to suggest that Riyadh is currently “pushing” for any of these solutions; I imagine, rather, that all options would be discussed first with partners. Let us not forget that the idea of a non-aggression pact is nothing new and has been proposed by numerous parties. As such, the question becomes not whether it is likely to be true, but how it would be implemented.
As for where we stand today, I would argue that the mood in Riyadh is definitely aimed at preventing a resumption of the war and achieving the unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Once this is achieved, discussions with Iran about its other threats and concerns should resume quickly, be it in a Helsinki process format or any other agreed upon way.
• Faisal J. Abbas is the Editor-in-Chief of Arab News. X: @FaisalJAbbas
