Benjamin A Engel
The rejuvenated relationship between South Korea and Japan, crucial for trilateral US–South Korea–Japan security cooperation, rests upon a wobbly foundation of contentious historical grievances. Despite attempts to address these issues, which trace back to Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula in the early twentieth century, Japan’s lack of reciprocity and domestic discontent with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s approach to Japan complicate progress.
Since taking office in 2022, Yoon has tried to establish ‘future-oriented’ relations with Japan through a magnanimous approach to historical issues.
South Korea–Japan relations were at a low point when Yoon was inaugurated, having sharply deteriorated after the South Korean Supreme Court ordered Japanese companies to compensate forced labourers in 2018. In response, Japan removed South Korea from its export whitelist in 2019.
To resolve the issue, the Yoon administration created a foundation in early 2023 to compensate former forced labourers. This foundation was to be funded by Japanese companies that profited from forced labour and South Korean companies that profited from funds provided by Japan when relations were normalised in 1965.
This agreement ushered in the current moment of trilateral cooperation. As emphasised in the Spirit of Camp David document and by Yoon himself, this agreement was a necessary precondition for strengthening trilateral US–South Korea–Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
But the foundation is not panning out as planned. While South Korean companies contributed immediately, Japanese contributions only began in May 2024. Even worse, the Japanese companies that benefitted from forced labour were not among the contributors.
Similarly, in July 2024, South Korea and Japan agreed to designate the Sado gold mine as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Initially it was reported that the site would house an exhibit about the plight of Korean forced labourers and hold an annual memorial ceremony in their honour.
But soon after the deal was announced, the South Korean media was quick to note that the exhibition installed to satisfy Korean concerns did not actually use the word ‘forced’ to describe Korean labourers. To make matters worse, the South Korean government had requested that Japan use the word ‘forced’ in the exhibition, but the Japanese government refused. For many in South Korea this is another example of concessions by Yoon without reciprocation from Japan.
Historical disputes persist across South Korea–Japan relations. In March 2024, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Japanese diplomats to receive complaints about revisions to Japanese middle school textbooks that it views as historical distortions.
In April 2024, Japanese officials received another demarche about renewed Japanese claims to the disputed Dokdo (Takeshima) islets.
Outside South Korea, attention is focused on positive trilateral developments, such as the release of a Joint Leaders’ Statement to commemorate the anniversary of the Camp David Summit. In July 2024, the defence ministers of the three countries signed an agreement to institutionalise security cooperation and the three countries held the first ‘Freedom Edge’ multi-domain exercise in June 2024.
But for South Koreans, these developments only seem possible because the Yoon administration has muted domestic displeasure. If South Korean anger over Japan’s lack of reciprocity was fully voiced, it is doubtful whether progress in trilateral cooperation would be so brisk.
This raises concerns about the future of trilateral cooperation under a progressive South Korean president. The opposition has consistently criticised the Yoon administration’s Japan policy, dubbing it ‘humiliating diplomacy’.
Democratic Party Representative Lee Jae-myung, a likely candidate in the 2027 presidential election, lambasted Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, questioning whether the Sado mine decision benefited the pride or interests of the Korean people. Given the trajectory of South Korea–Japan interactions on historical issues and the opposition’s response, it is hard to imagine Lee upholding the current level of bilateral and trilateral cooperation if elected.
Criticism of the Yoon administration’s Japan policy has dovetailed with backlash against appointments made by Yoon to history-related government posts. Academics associated with South Korea’s ‘New Right’ movement, which argues there were positive outcomes of Japanese colonialism, have been selected to lead key historical institutions. These include the National Institute of Korean History, the Academy of Korean Studies and the Independence Hall of Korea.
This has intensified historical disputes within South Korea and a future progressive president will undoubtedly seek to reverse these changes.
Recent polling indicates that there is strong South Korean support for strengthening trilateral security cooperation in light of the North Korean nuclear threat. But while Japanese citizens identify North Korea, China and Russia as the top three national security threats, South Koreans identify the top three threats as North Korea, China and Japan.
In other words, while most see trilateral security as helpful, many South Koreans do not fully trust Japan and historical issues only further antagonise them. While South Korea must address its own domestic battles over history, Japan could go a long way in selling trilateral cooperation by demonstrating that it is not a threat.
The best way to do this is for Japan to confront its colonial past and honour agreements on historical issues, reflecting their professed shared values.
Benjamin A Engel is Research Professor at the Institute of International Affairs, Seoul National University.
