Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg
The Trump administration last month released its National Security Strategy. The document, which is required by law, typically presents the approach American presidents plan to take during their time in office, usually stressing continuity and stability. This strategy, however, marks a clear shift in US foreign policy.
The new strategy has received mixed reviews. In Europe, there was shock and dismay, reminiscent of the reactions on the continent to Vice President J.D. Vance’s stunning remarks at the Munich Security Conference in February, when he chastised European leaders and institutions, especially the EU.
While criticism of the strategy has again focused on the US’ chastisement of Europe for its relatively open migration policy and the administration’s implicit support for extreme-right groups, it contains an equally scathing dressing down over Europe’s economic and defense policies. Europe has seen its share of global gross domestic product fall from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today, the strategy says, partly due to the EU.
In a clear departure from former President Joe Biden’s approach to the war in Ukraine, the strategy criticizes Europe for refusing a peace deal and asking the US to bankroll the war with Russia. The strategy must have alarmed Western and Northern European nations by favoring “Central, Eastern and Southern Europe” for trade, weapons sales, political collaboration, and cultural and educational exchanges.
There has also been strong criticism from South America, where the administration appears to be reviving the Monroe Doctrine in both rhetoric and action, as is evident in the attacks on suspected drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean. However, Russia and China are probably relieved that they are not as demonized here as they were in Biden’s National Security Strategy of 2022.
The Middle East is probably the main, if not the only, bright spot in the strategy, describing US policy in the region as “shifting burdens, building peace.” But the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are “thankfully over.” That is not “because the Middle East no longer matters, but because it is no longer the constant irritant, and potential source of imminent catastrophe, that it once was.” Instead, it is emerging as a “place of partnership, friendship and investment — a trend that should be welcomed and encouraged.”
Because of that, the US is ending its 50-year-long focus on the Middle East, which was due to that region being “the world’s most important supplier of energy, a prime theater of superpower competition and rife with conflict that threatened to spill into the wider world and even to our own shores.”
Today, according to the strategy, two of those dynamics no longer hold. Energy supplies have diversified greatly, with the US once again a net energy exporter. And superpower competition has given way to America gaining the upper hand, reinforced by Trump’s “successful revitalization of our alliances in the Gulf, with other Arab partners and with Israel.”
While the strategy admits that “conflict remains the Middle East’s most troublesome dynamic,” Iran, described as the “chief destabilizing force,” has been “greatly weakened.” The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains “thorny,” but the strategy gives Trump deserved praise for the Gaza ceasefire and progress toward a more permanent peace.
So, America’s “historic reason” for focusing on the Middle East will recede. Instead, the region will increasingly become a “source and destination” of international investment in industries well beyond oil and gas, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence and defense technologies.
Unlike the other parts of the strategy, which seem adversarial, here it says that the US should be cooperative, working with “Middle East partners to advance other economic interests, from securing supply chains to bolstering opportunities to develop friendly and open markets in other parts of the world such as Africa.”
More praise is heaped on “Middle East partners” who have demonstrated “commitment to combating radicalism, a trendline American policy should continue to encourage.”
Success of this cooperative policy requires “dropping America’s misguided experiment with hectoring these nations — especially the Gulf monarchies — into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government.” On the contrary, the US should “encourage and applaud reform when and where it emerges organically, without trying to impose it from without.”
The key to successful relations with the Middle East is accepting the region, its leaders and its nations as they are while working together on areas of common interest, the strategy says. It names some of those shared interests as ensuring that Gulf energy supplies do not fall into the hands of an outright enemy and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and the Red Sea navigable.
Besides energy and maritime security, the strategy prioritizes combating terrorism, ensuring that the region does not become an “incubator or exporter of terror against American interests.” However, it says that this threat should be addressed without fruitless “nation-building” wars.
The strategy expresses the US desire to expand the Abraham Accords to more nations in the region and to other countries in the Muslim world. But even here, the strategy is America-focused. It says that Trump’s ability to “unite the Arab world” at Sharm El-Sheikh in pursuit of peace will allow the US to “finally prioritize American interests.”
In light of the document’s focus on “America First,” “burden sharing” and distaste for war, one would think that the US would change its policy toward Israel, which is more of a free rider than Europe. The US funds Israel’s wars, which seem to be contrary to US policy, such as in Syria, and damaging to US interests in the region as a whole. This fact is becoming clearer to US policymakers and voters, but acting on it may take some time.
The strategy describes Trump’s foreign policy as motivated above all by what works for America, which is a fair description. It adds that it is not grounded in traditional political ideology but is instead “pragmatic without being ‘pragmatist,’ realistic without being ‘realist,’ principled without being ‘idealistic,’ muscular without being ‘hawkish’ and restrained without being ‘dovish.’”
It is clear from the strategy that Gulf Cooperation Council countries will remain an important focus area for this administration, but not for the old reasons. It is a place for shared interests, including energy, as both the US and the GCC countries are major exporters of energy. Trump is counting on them to be key partners in trade and investment, including triangular investment involving other countries and regions, such as Africa.
Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation
