Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy
With the UN Security Council’s adoption of the US resolution endorsing President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza, the Palestinian file has entered one of its most delicate phases since the eruption of the war. What began as a 20-point proposal circulating through bilateral and regional understandings has now been pushed by Washington into the realm of binding international legitimacy — backed by an unusually broad Arab and Islamic consensus that includes Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The proposal is no longer merely an American initiative; it has become a political and security framework protected by the authority of the UN, meant to shape the contours of Gaza’s post-war phase, and perhaps the future of the Palestinian question.
Granting the plan international endorsement gives it political and legal weight not seen since Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. The next stage will no longer depend on fragmented negotiations or piecemeal mediation efforts, but on a unified international process that enables the formation of a “International Stabilization Force” working in coordination with Egypt, Israel, and newly trained Palestinian police units. Its mandate includes border security, disarming non-state armed groups, securing humanitarian corridors, protecting civilians, and supporting reconstruction. The establishment of a “Peace Council” as a transitional governing body for Gaza through the end of 2027 adds an institutional dimension that goes well beyond the original American paper.
What is new in the final version of the resolution is the inclusion of explicit language referring to the “possibility of establishing a future Palestinian state” — conditional on the Palestinian Authority carrying out major reforms and upon the launch of Gaza’s reconstruction, which together “may create the conditions for a credible path toward self-determination.” Washington also commits to launching direct dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians to define a political horizon for “peaceful and prosperous coexistence,” thus returning, at least on paper, the notion of a political settlement to the table after years of treating the issue purely as a security file.
The resolution also builds on the European role, particularly the EU’s proposal to train 3,000 Gaza-based Palestinian police officers as a foundation for rebuilding a 13,000-strong security force, while expanding the mandate of the European monitoring mission in Rafah to include other crossings. In this sense, the plan becomes a complex web of American, European, Arab, and international roles rather than a unilateral US initiative.
Yet the entry of the project into this phase has not been free of resistance. Moscow immediately submitted a competing draft resolution that mirrors the general idea, but omits two essential elements: the Peace Council, which effectively grants the White House significant influence over the transition, and the ability to form a stabilization force outside UN structures. The Russian draft shifts the center of gravity back to the UN by asking the secretary-general to present “options” for an international force, thus restricting the room for unilateral US manoeuvre. The confrontation is, therefore, not merely a vote of “yes” or “no,” but a clash between two visions: an expansive American design centered on Trump’s 20-point plan, versus a more cautious Russian — and implicitly Chinese — approach. Even with the passage of the US resolution, negotiations, and amendments are likely to continue to reassure Moscow, Beijing, and other hesitant members.
While the adoption of the resolution is undeniably a diplomatic victory for Washington and a rare moment of regional alignment, its implementation represents a far more difficult test. Israel faces deep internal divisions: The nationalist and religious right opposes any withdrawal, any international force, and any expanded role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. This resistance could quickly morph into a political crisis or produce on-ground pressures that obstruct implementation.
On the Palestinian side, the picture is even more fragile. Gaza lacks a unified and legitimate governing authority; the Palestinian Authority itself suffers from a crisis of legitimacy and performance; and Hamas’ future remains ambiguous. Will it be politically integrated? Fully disarmed? Allowed to remain in a diminished form? The uncertainty surrounding its role makes the transitional period inherently unstable and vulnerable to collapse.
As for the International Stabilization Force, it remains more conceptual than real. No state has yet declared a clear willingness to operate inside the densely populated and highly volatile “old Gaza” areas. If the force fails to materialize or emerges too weak to carry out its mandated tasks, ranging from border security to disarmament and police support, the entire plan could unravel before it begins.
The economic and reconstruction dimension is no less critical. Without rapid and tangible reconstruction, public trust will erode, and the people of Gaza may perceive the resolution as a continuation of the blockade rather than a path out of it. Experiences in Bosnia, Iraq, and Lebanon show how delayed reconstruction can doom even the most carefully crafted frameworks.
Still, the plan cannot be reduced to a mere repackaging of crisis management. For the first time since Oslo, there is a transitional framework that carries at least the potential for a political evolution, dependent on Palestinian unity, Israeli de-escalation, and genuine international commitment to funding reconstruction and supporting the international force. The resolution plants the seed of a solution, yet simultaneously contains all the ingredients for becoming another mechanism for crisis maintenance if the central challenges of security, governance, and reconstruction remain unresolved.
The US-backed resolution enters its implementation phase with two opposing faces. It is a political opportunity if the necessary elements fall into place, and it may mark the beginning of a broader settlement. But it is equally capable of devolving into an improved form of crisis management if those elements fail to align. Its success hinges on a decisive triangle: Washington-Cairo-the Palestinian leadership. Should this triangle succeed in managing the complex balances and restraining the disruptive actors, Gaza may move from a battlefield to a model of political transition. If not, if Israeli politics remain governed by its current hard-right dynamics, or if Palestinian division persists, then the resolution risks becoming a well-written agreement … with no future.
Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. X: @ALMenawy
