ASEAN’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute began informally and incrementally. As Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, China and Taiwan firmed up their territorial claims, the dispute raised concerns from with and outside the region.
From 1990 to 2002, Indonesia, with funding from Canada, hosted a series of Workshops on managing potential conflict in the South China Sea. Although dubbed a non-official activity to which the participants came in their ‘individual, private capacity’, the workshops, in the words of former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino, had ‘an ASEAN aura’ to them.
ASEAN cannot evade the issue as four of its members are involved in the dispute. The late 1980s witnessed China’s growing assertiveness. Sixty-four Vietnamese sailors died when they clashed with Chinese forces in the Spratly Islands in 1988. In February 1992, China passed its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which claimed sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. In July 1992, in the face of heightened tension, ASEAN issued its Declaration on the South China Sea — underscoring the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the area.
In March 1995, impelled by the discovery of Chinese structures surreptitiously constructed on Mischief Reef — which China argued were intended to provide refuge and support for fishermen operating in the region — ASEAN issued its Statement on Recent Developments in the South China Sea. It again stressed the need to maintain peace and stability in the region through peaceful resolution of disputes and adherence to international law, particularly, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Over time, it became apparent that China’s actions were part of a broader effort to assert territorial claims over the South China Sea, which eventually led to the construction of military facilities on the reef in the 2010s. In earlier ASEAN–China exchanges, the South China Sea was reputedly treated as an after-dinner topic. But over time, as the dialogues gained traction, it became a central item in open discussions.
Guarded optimism swept the region in late 2002 when ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It was a watershed document that mediated the dissonant and dangerous dynamics of the claimant states.
The declaration was a dramatic departure from the assertiveness of the South China Sea dispute’s protagonists. Despite lingering distrust, it brought to the fore the possibility of cooperation among the claimants and proved ASEAN’s ability to forge a unified position on a complex, region-wide issue of strategic importance. It also demonstrated how China can be persuaded to recalibrate its position.
The declaration was expected to pave the way for a successor agreement — the code of conduct, which was meant to preclude further escalation of the dispute. But its long absence has emboldened claimants to carry out expansion, fortification, coercion and even environmental degradation in the area.
The overlapping claims are in contest in the South China Sea against the backdrop of a geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States. Even as ASEAN and China strive to find common ground to craft a code of conduct, it would be foolhardy to drive out the United States and other extra-regional stakeholders, because they have their own strategic stakes in the South China Sea.
The asymmetrical distances that ASEAN members maintain with the major powers translate into variations in their respective positions towards the South China Sea dispute. Strong disagreements on how to respond to China’s actions following the Scarborough Shoal standoff prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint statement in its 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Cambodia, then Chair of ASEAN and a close partner of China, sought to exclude the matter from the joint communique, drawing livid reactions from concerned ASEAN members.
It is thus not surprising that ASEAN has not issued any official statement referring to the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Even as the Court invalidated China’s expansive nine-dash line claim, the prevailing circumstances deterred the group from coming out with a formal, unified position.
After more than two decades, several impediments to the code of conduct remain. Defining the geographical scope of the code is both fundamental and contentious. China wants the scope limited to areas where it does not have complete control, while the Philippines and Vietnam, seek inclusion of all disputed maritime features. As China claims nearly 90 per cent of the South China Sea, it makes sense for the code of conduct to include overlaps.
China also seeks a flexible, non-binding code, while ASEAN wants a code that is legally binding. Having clear rules and mechanisms encourages compliance and accountability. Without this, the code of conduct would likely become an impotent document.
Prohibiting military activities in the South China Sea is salient to preventing untoward incidents and a central purpose of the code of conduct. Limiting installation of military infrastructure, weapons deployment and military exercises would be expected to reduce the possibility of violent engagements.
For the Philippines and perhaps Vietnam, the involvement of external powers, such as the United States, translates into having a necessary counterweight to China. China insists on disallowing external parties to engage in security partnerships or exercises with regional states. ASEAN stresses that freedom of navigation and overflight be preserved in accordance with UNCLOS, which guarantees the right of passage for all states through international waters. China also vows adherence to these rules, but in practice it pushes back on freedom of navigation operations by rival outside powers.
Despite their professed commitment to finalising a code of conduct — including their latest 2026 deadline — ASEAN’s and China’s efforts are moving at a slow pace. Renewed or intensified military activity in the South China Sea undermines every avowal to peaceful dispute settlement.
China evidently benefits from the status quo as it indurates and stretches its military presence in the area. But ASEAN cannot afford to be oblivious as the disputed waters constantly and ominously change.
Jaime Naval is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman.
Source: East Asia Forum
